BJP’s weaker than expected performance in the 2024 national elections is a result of the party’s overreliance on Modi’s brand, which led it to ignore economic discontent and regional issues. Furthermore, in UP, the united opposition was more successful in harnessing caste identity to mobilise votes, in contrast to the BJP, which tried it on Hindutva lines.  

Ideological politics in India can be measured along the axes of statism and recognition. The BJP positioned itself higher on the statism axis, promoting centralisation, in contrast to the opposition, believing in greater decentralisation. Similarly, the BJP advocates for a unified Hindu nationalist identity, in contrast to the opposition, that positions itself as a secular, inclusive alliance. Hindutva nationalism might have been successful for the BJP in the previous elections; however, by 2024, states such as Uttar Pradesh made it clear that religious identity may no longer work. BJP’s religious identity politics fell short of the INDIA bloc’s caste identity politics, which mobilised and consolidated large portions of OBCs, Dalits, and Muslim voters.

Moreover, Lallu Singh, BJP’s Ayodhya MP candidate, commented that they ‘Need 2/3rd majority to change or make new Constitution’. Such comments helped the opposition portray the BJP as an authoritarian party that threatens the Indian constitution. INDIA bloc leveraged this comment to position themselves as trying to protect the constitution, democracy, and reservations.

Accountability politics, or the politics of vikaas, refer to voters’ judgement on government performance. This can be in the form of economic performance, inflation, unemployment, etc. In the previous two elections, the BJP successfully capitalised on the narrative of vikaas, highlighting its developmental achievements. However, in 2024, the vishwas element took centre stage, overshadowing economic concerns such as unemployment and inflation. The opposition picked up these issues. According to the CSDS-Lokniti pre-poll study, 62% of participants thought it was tougher to get a job, and 71% were unhappy with prices going up. Younger voters, who can be classified as retrospective egotropic, were especially unhappy because they felt that the government was not providing enough job prospects, especially in light of the regular exam paper leaks that caused delays in hiring for government positions. Since Indian voters post the 2000s have become more sensitive to economic performance in judging governments, it is not unusual that perceived economic failures caused a lower expected performance in this election.

Leader-driven politics, or the politics of vishwas, involve keeping Modi at the party's centre. This translates into the concentration of resources into developing his brand. For far too long, the BJP relied simply on Modi’s charisma and branding to gain voters. This has made it complacent in addressing other issues the opposition took advantage of. In Uttar Pradesh, where the BJP’s seat share dropped from 62 in 2019 to 32, voters grew tired of campaigns solely based on Modi’s persona and highlighted the poor candidate choices of the BJP. Unpopular candidates from the BJP that relied on Modi’s name competed against the opposition’s candidates who were carefully chosen to ensure they connected with the constituency.

Moreover, slogans such as “ab ki baar 400 paar” signalled to voters the growing overconfidence of the party and created more rifts. Modi’s branding was also challenged by that of Akhilesh Yadav, who was more involved in raising issues that directly affected voters, particularly the “Pichde-Dalit-Alpsankhyak”. Modi’s nationalistic appeal fell short of Yadav’s localised appeal among the lower castes and minorities. The same dynamics can also be perceived in West Bengal, where Mamata Banerjee’s appeal among voters was key to the Trinamool Congress winning seven more seats than the previous election, as opposed to the BJP, which lost six.  

References:

Chhibber, P. K., & Verma, R. (2018). Ideology and identity: The changing party systems of India. Oxford University Press.

Jaldi, A. S. (2024). Retrospective analysis of the 2024 Indian elections: BJP wins the general elections against the strengthening opposition of the INDIA bloc (Policy Paper No. 10/24). Institute for South Asian Studies. https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/2024-06/PP_10-24_Jaldi.pdf

Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Paldam, M. (2000). Economic voting: an introduction. Electoral Studies, 19(2-3), 113-121.

Sen, R., & Khattri, R. (2024). The BJP debacle in Uttar Pradesh. Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/the-bjp-debacle-in-uttar-pradesh/

Sircar, N. (2020). The politics of vishwas: political mobilization in the 2019 national election. Contemporary South Asia, 28(2), 178–194.

Vaishnav, M., & Swanson, R. (2015). Does good economics make for good politics? Evidence from Indian states. India Review, 14(3), 279-311.

Venugopal, V. (2024). Why BJP lost Lok Sabha polls in Uttar Pradesh: 6 reasons in party report. NDTV. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/why-bjp-lost-lok-sabha-polls-in-uttar-pradesh-partys-report-highlights-6-reasons-6130273 


The Limits of Vishwas: How Overcentralisation Hurt the BJP

This piece is based on the following interview with Dr. Jagdeep Chhokar.
Link: https://caravanmagazine.in/politics/chhokar-democracy-elections-funding

Representative democracy, a form of governance designed to overcome the challenges of direct democracy, is neither “representative” nor “democratic” in India, owing to the structure of political parties and electoral institutions.

The Assembly (Ekklesia) of Ancient Athens was a central institution of Athenian democracy. Important decisions, such as lawmaking, war, foreign policy, and financial matters, were taken through direct participation by each citizen. Anyone had the right to step forward and speak (ho boulomenos) directly without any representative. However, this means of democracy faced several limitations that representative democracy aimed to solve.

With the world transitioning from city-states to nation-states, it became impractical for citizens to gather and vote on each decision, as the ancient Athenians did. Therefore, representatives—elected by the citizens—would gather in legislative bodies to make decisions on behalf of the electorate. However, as Chhokar argues, if candidates from a constituency can be elected by winning only 15% of the votes, how can they “represent” the constituency?

Another criticism of direct democracy was the limited expertise of the masses and their vulnerability to persuasion by a charming orator, resulting in poor decisions. With the division of labour being applied in all professions, it seems logical to also consider politics a profession that requires expertise, which goes against the beliefs of Athenians, who distrusted “career politicians.” By adding representatives, a layer of filtration was created to enable the best among the citizens to be representatives. However, what prevents representatives from swaying voters, just as speakers could sway the masses in the Ekklesia? James Wilson and James Madison articulated that larger constituencies would solve this problem since the risk of electing demagogues who could manipulate smaller groups would be reduced.

Larger constituencies, while addressing one problem, create another. They create a barrier to entry since large amounts of financial capital are required to mobilize and reach voters. This filters out candidates who may be poorer. Indeed, as Chhokar points out, it is usually richer candidates who get elected. This principle of distinction was explicitly intentional in earlier US, UK, and French political systems. However, despite the elimination of a legal landowning requirement, it is still visible today.

The principle of distinction, intended to bring forth citizens with more virtue and integrity, instead manifests itself as electing candidates with criminal cases against them. Ordinary people, according to Chhokar, perceive failure in the state and the court’s ability to deliver justice, resorting to “Robin Hoods.” There is a clear distinction between representatives with muscle power and will and the powerless electorate. It was believed that by having representatives from a wealthier class, they would be less likely to be influenced by corruption and foreign influence. However, as Chhokar points out, candidates who win and become ministers see their wealth increase by more than three times, a rate far higher than that of an ordinary citizen.

At the time when the French and American constitutions were drafted, the existence of political parties or factions was limited. However, their existence now creates yet another filter for representation. Political parties enable candidates to utilize party machinery to mobilize voters, reach more people through the media, and take advantage of voters’ party preferences. Individual candidates simply cannot compete at this level. This is true; as Chhokar points out, people would rather choose a criminal politician if they are part of the big parties (BJP, Congress) and have a role in governance than choose an independent candidate.

From direct democracy, where anyone could participate in decision-making, to initial representative democracies, where voters could choose any representative, we move to our current system, which has strangled voter choice. As Chhokar points out, the choice of MPs is completely controlled by the political party. A candidate, therefore, must vote for bills proposed by their parties, even if they are harmful to their constituency. In this manner, the representative is no longer serving the interests of the voters but of the parties. This is further exacerbated by the problem of corporate lobbying through donations and electoral bonds. The loopholes in donation disclosures allow parties to serve the interests of the wealthy while the voters have limited knowledge of these transactions. Chhokar concludes by saying that addressing these challenges requires political parties to be more democratic in choosing to give out tickets.

References:

Manin, B. (1997). The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ashraf, A. (2019). Forget being a rich man's democracy, we are not even a democracy: ADR's Jagdeep S Chhokar. The Caravan. https://caravanmagazine.in/politics/chhokar-democracy-elections-funding



Politics

The Limits of Vishwas: How Overcentralisation Hurt the BJP

Representative democracy in India is neither “representative” nor “democratic”