This piece is based on the following interview with Dr. Jagdeep Chhokar. Link: https://caravanmagazine.in/politics/chhokar-democracy-elections-funding Representative democracy, a form of governance designed to overcome the challenges of direct democracy, is neither “representative” nor “democratic” in India, owing to the structure of political parties and electoral institutions. The Assembly (Ekklesia) of Ancient Athens was a central institution of Athenian democracy. Important decisions, such as lawmaking, war, foreign policy, and financial matters, were taken through direct participation by each citizen. Anyone had the right to step forward and speak (ho boulomenos) directly without any representative. However, this means of democracy faced several limitations that representative democracy aimed to solve. With the world transitioning from city-states to nation-states, it became impractical for citizens to gather and vote on each decision, as the ancient Athenians did. Therefore, representatives—elected by the citizens—would gather in legislative bodies to make decisions on behalf of the electorate. However, as Chhokar argues, if candidates from a constituency can be elected by winning only 15% of the votes, how can they “represent” the constituency? Another criticism of direct democracy was the limited expertise of the masses and their vulnerability to persuasion by a charming orator, resulting in poor decisions. With the division of labour being applied in all professions, it seems logical to also consider politics a profession that requires expertise, which goes against the beliefs of Athenians, who distrusted “career politicians.” By adding representatives, a layer of filtration was created to enable the best among the citizens to be representatives. However, what prevents representatives from swaying voters, just as speakers could sway the masses in the Ekklesia? James Wilson and James Madison articulated that larger constituencies would solve this problem since the risk of electing demagogues who could manipulate smaller groups would be reduced. Larger constituencies, while addressing one problem, create another. They create a barrier to entry since large amounts of financial capital are required to mobilize and reach voters. This filters out candidates who may be poorer. Indeed, as Chhokar points out, it is usually richer candidates who get elected. This principle of distinction was explicitly intentional in earlier US, UK, and French political systems. However, despite the elimination of a legal landowning requirement, it is still visible today. The principle of distinction, intended to bring forth citizens with more virtue and integrity, instead manifests itself as electing candidates with criminal cases against them. Ordinary people, according to Chhokar, perceive failure in the state and the court’s ability to deliver justice, resorting to “Robin Hoods.” There is a clear distinction between representatives with muscle power and will and the powerless electorate. It was believed that by having representatives from a wealthier class, they would be less likely to be influenced by corruption and foreign influence. However, as Chhokar points out, candidates who win and become ministers see their wealth increase by more than three times, a rate far higher than that of an ordinary citizen. At the time when the French and American constitutions were drafted, the existence of political parties or factions was limited. However, their existence now creates yet another filter for representation. Political parties enable candidates to utilize party machinery to mobilize voters, reach more people through the media, and take advantage of voters’ party preferences. Individual candidates simply cannot compete at this level. This is true; as Chhokar points out, people would rather choose a criminal politician if they are part of the big parties (BJP, Congress) and have a role in governance than choose an independent candidate. From direct democracy, where anyone could participate in decision-making, to initial representative democracies, where voters could choose any representative, we move to our current system, which has strangled voter choice. As Chhokar points out, the choice of MPs is completely controlled by the political party. A candidate, therefore, must vote for bills proposed by their parties, even if they are harmful to their constituency. In this manner, the representative is no longer serving the interests of the voters but of the parties. This is further exacerbated by the problem of corporate lobbying through donations and electoral bonds. The loopholes in donation disclosures allow parties to serve the interests of the wealthy while the voters have limited knowledge of these transactions. Chhokar concludes by saying that addressing these challenges requires political parties to be more democratic in choosing to give out tickets. References: Manin, B. (1997). The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ashraf, A. (2019). Forget being a rich man's democracy, we are not even a democracy: ADR's Jagdeep S Chhokar. The Caravan. https://caravanmagazine.in/politics/chhokar-democracy-elections-funding

Representative democracy in India is neither “representative” nor “democratic”