BJP’s weaker than expected performance in the 2024 national elections is a result of the party’s overreliance on Modi’s brand, which led it to ignore economic discontent and regional issues. Furthermore, in UP, the united opposition was more successful in harnessing caste identity to mobilise votes, in contrast to the BJP, which tried it on Hindutva lines. Ideological politics in India can be measured along the axes of statism and recognition. The BJP positioned itself higher on the statism axis, promoting centralisation, in contrast to the opposition, believing in greater decentralisation. Similarly, the BJP advocates for a unified Hindu nationalist identity, in contrast to the opposition, that positions itself as a secular, inclusive alliance. Hindutva nationalism might have been successful for the BJP in the previous elections; however, by 2024, states such as Uttar Pradesh made it clear that religious identity may no longer work. BJP’s religious identity politics fell short of the INDIA bloc’s caste identity politics, which mobilised and consolidated large portions of OBCs, Dalits, and Muslim voters. Moreover, Lallu Singh, BJP’s Ayodhya MP candidate, commented that they ‘Need 2/3rd majority to change or make new Constitution’. Such comments helped the opposition portray the BJP as an authoritarian party that threatens the Indian constitution. INDIA bloc leveraged this comment to position themselves as trying to protect the constitution, democracy, and reservations. Accountability politics, or the politics of vikaas, refer to voters’ judgement on government performance. This can be in the form of economic performance, inflation, unemployment, etc. In the previous two elections, the BJP successfully capitalised on the narrative of vikaas, highlighting its developmental achievements. However, in 2024, the vishwas element took centre stage, overshadowing economic concerns such as unemployment and inflation. The opposition picked up these issues. According to the CSDS-Lokniti pre-poll study, 62% of participants thought it was tougher to get a job, and 71% were unhappy with prices going up. Younger voters, who can be classified as retrospective egotropic, were especially unhappy because they felt that the government was not providing enough job prospects, especially in light of the regular exam paper leaks that caused delays in hiring for government positions. Since Indian voters post the 2000s have become more sensitive to economic performance in judging governments, it is not unusual that perceived economic failures caused a lower expected performance in this election. Leader-driven politics, or the politics of vishwas, involve keeping Modi at the party's centre. This translates into the concentration of resources into developing his brand. For far too long, the BJP relied simply on Modi’s charisma and branding to gain voters. This has made it complacent in addressing other issues the opposition took advantage of. In Uttar Pradesh, where the BJP’s seat share dropped from 62 in 2019 to 32, voters grew tired of campaigns solely based on Modi’s persona and highlighted the poor candidate choices of the BJP. Unpopular candidates from the BJP that relied on Modi’s name competed against the opposition’s candidates who were carefully chosen to ensure they connected with the constituency. Moreover, slogans such as “ab ki baar 400 paar” signalled to voters the growing overconfidence of the party and created more rifts. Modi’s branding was also challenged by that of Akhilesh Yadav, who was more involved in raising issues that directly affected voters, particularly the “Pichde-Dalit-Alpsankhyak”. Modi’s nationalistic appeal fell short of Yadav’s localised appeal among the lower castes and minorities. The same dynamics can also be perceived in West Bengal, where Mamata Banerjee’s appeal among voters was key to the Trinamool Congress winning seven more seats than the previous election, as opposed to the BJP, which lost six. References: Chhibber, P. K., & Verma, R. (2018). Ideology and identity: The changing party systems of India. Oxford University Press. Jaldi, A. S. (2024). Retrospective analysis of the 2024 Indian elections: BJP wins the general elections against the strengthening opposition of the INDIA bloc (Policy Paper No. 10/24). Institute for South Asian Studies. https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/2024-06/PP_10-24_Jaldi.pdf Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Paldam, M. (2000). Economic voting: an introduction. Electoral Studies, 19(2-3), 113-121. Sen, R., & Khattri, R. (2024). The BJP debacle in Uttar Pradesh. Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/the-bjp-debacle-in-uttar-pradesh/ Sircar, N. (2020). The politics of vishwas: political mobilization in the 2019 national election. Contemporary South Asia, 28(2), 178–194. Vaishnav, M., & Swanson, R. (2015). Does good economics make for good politics? Evidence from Indian states. India Review, 14(3), 279-311. Venugopal, V. (2024). Why BJP lost Lok Sabha polls in Uttar Pradesh: 6 reasons in party report. NDTV. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/why-bjp-lost-lok-sabha-polls-in-uttar-pradesh-partys-report-highlights-6-reasons-6130273

The Limits of Vishwas: How Overcentralisation Hurt the BJP